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SUING  FOREIGN  OFFICIALS  IN  U.S.  COURTS:
UPHOLDING  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS  BY




As human rights atrocities continue to shock our world media, the inter-
national community is calling for ways to hold accountable the government
actors who commit egregious acts of terror against their people.1  Advocates
have turned to U.S. courts as one arena in which violations of human rights
may be vindicated.2  Yet, no matter how commendable the fight for interna-
tional human rights may be, there remains a fundamental jurisdictional bar
to these suits: sovereign immunity.
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2015; Bachelor of Arts, Social
Relations and Policy, Michigan State University, 2012.  I thank Professor A.J. Bellia for his
inspiration for the topic of this Note as well as his invaluable guidance and commentary
throughout the writing process.  I would also like to thank my family for all their love and
support.  Finally, I thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their skilled editing
in preparing this Note for publication.  All errors are my own.
1 See Mark C. Eades, China’s Excuses for Its Human Rights Record Don’t Hold Water, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-re
port/2014/01/17/china-has-no-excuse-for-its-poor-human-rights-record; Andrew E.
Kramer, In Ukraine Protests over New Laws, Sticks and Stones Are Met with Tear Gas, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/world/europe/in-ukraine-protests-
over-new-laws-sticks-and-firecrackers-meet-tear-gas.html?hpw&rref=world&_r=0; Nicholas
Kristof, Op-Ed., How To Truly Honor Mandela, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ny
times.com/2013/12/12/opinion/kristof-how-to-truly-honor-mandela.html (urging both
Americans and the United States government to honor Mandela’s legacy by putting global
pressure on human rights abusers).
2 See Stephen Hopgood, The End of Human Rights, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-end-of-human-rights/2014/01/03/7f8fa83c-6742-
11e3-ae56-22de072140a2_story.html (noting that “Freedom House called on the United
States . . . to do more” for human rights). But see David G. Savage, Supreme Court Throws Out
Overseas Human Rights Case, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014, 8:42 AM), http://www.latimes.com/
nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-supreme-court-human-rights-abuses-20140114,0,341282.story#
axzz2quJNccSU (“The Supreme Court said again Tuesday that federal courts are not the
world’s forum for dealing with human rights abuses . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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Although sovereign immunity for foreign states has been codified in the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA),3 the Supreme Court held in
Samantar v. Yousuf that the FSIA does not codify immunity with respect to
foreign officials or heads of state.4  The Supreme Court opined, however,
that a suit against a foreign official “may still be barred by foreign sovereign
immunity under the common law.”5  The Supreme Court’s holding in
Samantar left it to the lower courts to decide how foreign official immunity
should be treated under the “common law.”6  On remand, the Fourth Circuit
concluded that foreign officials “are not entitled to foreign official immunity
for jus cogens violations [of international law],”7 which include atrocities such
as genocide,8 torture, and extrajudicial killing.9  The court reasoned that
because foreign officials may only claim immunity for acts “arguably attribu-
table to the state,” and “jus cogens violations are, by definition, acts that are
not officially authorized by the Sovereign,” foreign officials are not entitled
to immunity for jus cogens violations.10  This conclusion, however, poses con-
siderable problems, both constitutionally and pragmatically.  Most impor-
tantly, submitting foreign officials to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts
significantly affects U.S. foreign relations—an area delegated by the Constitu-
tion to the political branches.11
This Note will propose the constitutional framework courts should
implement when suits are brought against individual foreign officials post-
Samantar, specifically arguing that the constitutional allocation of foreign
affairs powers requires U.S. courts to broadly insulate foreign officials from
suit absent authorization from a political branch.12  Part I examines the law
of nations and its incorporation into the specific foreign relations powers
3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012)).  The FSIA presumes immunity
of a foreign state from suit.  28 U.S.C. § 1604.  However, it provides several exceptions to
this immunity, including: waiver by the foreign state, § 1605(a)(1), commercial activity of
the state which affects the United States, § 1605(a)(2), certain expropriation actions by the
foreign state, § 1605(a)(3), certain noncommercial torts committed by the foreign state,
§ 1605(a)(5), and actions to enforce an arbitral award, § 1605(a)(6).
4 560 U.S. 305, 323–24 (2010).
5 Id. at 324.
6 Id. at 324–25.
7 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 773, 777-78 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
897 (2014).
8 Id. at 775 (citing Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens,
34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 331 (2009)).
9 Id. at 778.
10 Id. at 775–77.
11 See infra Part I.
12 This Note confines its applicability to suits in the civil context, where customary
international law is unsettled. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law
and the U.S. Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 240–45.
Immunity in the criminal context has already been significantly eroded by customary inter-
national law and the jurisdiction of international tribunals. Id. at 238–40.  In the civil
context, it is important that customary international law is unsettled, as this lends further
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delegated by the Constitution to the political branches, highlighting that the
power to affect relations with foreign sovereigns resides in the political
branches.  Part II explains the Supreme Court’s development of foreign sov-
ereign immunity and the act of state doctrine—which were both informed by
the law of nations—leading up to its decision in Samantar.  Part III analyzes
Samantar after remand, with particular emphasis on the Fourth Circuit’s judi-
cially created abrogation of immunity for foreign officials when plaintiffs
allege violations of jus cogens norms of international law.  This Part also
describes the considerable problems, particularly constitutionally but also
pragmatically, with recognition of a judicially created jus cogens exception to
immunity.
Part IV proposes the constitutional framework under which analysis of a
foreign official’s amenability to suit should proceed.  Specifically, this Note
argues that the Constitution itself requires U.S. courts to abstain from enter-
ing a judgment against current and former officials of recognized foreign
sovereigns, absent express authorization from a political branch.  Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit’s judicially created abrogation of immunity for allegations
of jus cogens violations runs afoul of the separation of powers because it
usurps the constitutionally delegated powers of the political branches to
shape U.S. foreign relations.  Courts should first employ two separate immu-
nity doctrines in suits involving foreign officials: status-based immunity,
which bars suits against sitting heads of state and foreign officials, and con-
duct-based immunity, which bars suits for acts committed by officials in their
official capacities.  Finally, when suit is brought against an individual who was
or is an official of a recognized sovereign for acts committed in his official
capacity and within his sovereign territory, U.S. courts should invoke the act
of state doctrine to dismiss the suit because it is impermissible for American
courts to “sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another, done
within its own territory,”13 absent express authorization from a political
branch.  By refraining from entering judgment in suits against foreign offi-
cials, U.S. courts uphold the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs pow-
ers to the political branches.14
I. CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF POWERS
At the Founding, the law of nations provided the background upon
which the drafters of the Constitution relied when allocating foreign rela-
tions powers among the branches.15  Emmerich de Vattel’s treatise, The Law
of Nations, was well known to the Founders and informed “the men who . . .
weight to the conclusion that United States courts must err on the side of recognition of
perfect sovereign rights absent clear direction from the political branches not to do so.
13 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (quoting Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
14 The relative powers of Congress and the President to unilaterally depart from the
law of nations is beyond the scope of this Note.
15 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 28–46 (2009) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Federal Common Law]; Anthony
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drew up the Constitution of the United States.”16  The law of nations embod-
ied certain “perfect rights” of sovereign nations, which “included the rights
to exercise territorial sovereignty, conduct diplomatic relations, exercise neu-
tral rights, and peaceably enjoy liberty.”17  These rights were “so fundamental
that interference with any of them provided just cause for war.”18  In fact,
“[o]f all the rights possessed by a Nation,” Vattel wrote in The Law of Nations,
“that of sovereignty is doubtless the most important, and the one which
others should most carefully respect if they are desirous not to give cause for
offense.”19  As an element of sovereignty, Vattel noted that “[n]o foreign
State may inquire into the manner in which a sovereign rules, nor set itself
up as judge of his conduct.”20  At the time of ratification, the perfect rights of
sovereigns were well understood, and the Constitution was structured so as to
empower the new federal government to “conduct foreign relations” in light
of these perfect rights.21
The Constitution allocates specific foreign relations powers to each of
the political branches.22  Article I grants Congress the power to, inter alia,
“define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offenses against the Law of Nations,”23 “declare War, grant Letters of Mar-
que and Reprisal,”24 “raise and support Armies,”25 and “make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers.”26
Article II vests “[t]he executive Power . . . in a President,”27 and provides
that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,”28
J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Political Branches and the Law of Nations, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1795, 1795 (2010) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Political Branches].
16 Albert de Lapradelle, Introduction to EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR
THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW, at xxx n.1 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., Legal Classics
Library spec. ed. 1993) (1758); see also U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S.
452, 462 n.12 (1978) (noting that Vattel was the “international jurist most widely cited in
the first 50 years after the Revolution”).
17 Bellia & Clark, Political Branches, supra note 15, at 1799 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
18 Id.; see also 1 VATTEL, supra note 16, intro., § 17, at 7 (“Perfect rights are those which
carry with them the right of compelling the fulfillment of the corresponding
obligations . . . .”).
19 1 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk. II, ch. IV, § 54, at 131. See generally Bellia & Clark,
Federal Common Law, supra note 15, at 15–19 (discussing Vattel’s recognition of certain
rights of sovereigns in The Law of Nations and his treatise’s influence on the Founders).
20 1 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk. II, ch. IV, § 55, at 131.
21 Bellia & Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 15, at 31.
22 See generally id. at 31–33 (listing quotations from the Constitution of foreign rela-
tions powers granted to the President and Congress under Articles II and I, respectively).
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
24 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
25 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
26 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
27 Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
28 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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that “[h]e shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, to make Treaties,”29 that “he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,”30 and that “he shall
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”31  This power to send and
receive ambassadors “enabled the political branches, on behalf of the United
States, to recognize foreign nations as equal and independent sovereigns
under the law of nations.”32  This allocation of powers granted the authority
to conduct foreign relations to the federal political branches, and by implica-
tion, excluded the judiciary.33  The role of the Court, then, in upholding the
powers of the political branches is to understand perfect sovereign rights as
default principles to be employed until either political branch properly exer-
cises its power to infringe another nation’s sovereign rights.34
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S FOREIGN SOVEREIGNTY DEVELOPMENTS
This Part explores the history of foreign sovereign immunity and the act
of state doctrine, both of which arose out of the law of nations’ understand-
ing of a sovereign’s “perfect rights.”  Although head of state immunity and
the act of state doctrine in positive federal law can both be traced to Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange,35 they are now distinct
concepts.  Head of state immunity shields foreign individual officials from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.36  The act of state doctrine, on the other
hand, prohibits courts from questioning the validity of an act of a foreign
sovereign taken within its own territory, and thus merits dismissal of the suit
for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.37  Neither doc-
trine is expressly written into the Constitution, but denial of their protections
to foreign sovereigns traditionally would have been just cause for war.38
Today, it is not only unwise, but also an usurpation of the constitutional allo-
cation of foreign affairs powers, for courts, by exercising jurisdiction or ren-
dering judgment, to singlehandedly cause the United States to become
mired in a foreign conflict; such power is reserved to Congress and the Presi-
29 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
30 Id.
31 Id. art. II, § 3.
32 Bellia & Clark, Political Branches, supra note 15, at 1802 n.42.
33 Id. at 1802.  Resolution of the particular allocation of foreign affairs powers between
the two political branches is beyond the scope of this Note.  It bears recognition, however,
that until either of the political branches is deemed to have improperly exercised its corre-
sponding powers, the judicial branch should not interfere.
34 See Bellia & Clark, Federal Common Law, supra note 15, at 46–47.
35 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); see infra
subsection II.A.1.
36 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 321–22 (2010) (shielding foreign officials
when “the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to enforce a rule of law against the
state” as a whole (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 66(f) (1965)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1964).
38 See supra notes 15–18 and accompanying text.
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dent.  In the absence of a political branch exercising one of its powers, courts
should broadly apply immunity doctrines and the act of state doctrine—
thereby erring on the side of greater recognition of the perfect sovereign
rights of foreign nations in order to preserve the Constitution’s delegation of
foreign affairs powers to the political branches.
A. Head of State Immunity
Head of state immunity arose out of the law of nations—“[the sover-
eign’s] dignity alone, and the regard due to the Nation which he represents
and governs . . . exempts him from the jurisdiction of the [foreign] coun-
try.”39  Thus during the Framing, the person representing the sovereign
would have been understood as immune from U.S. courts’ jurisdiction.40
This Section will explore the American development of head of state immu-
nity and its incorporation of the law of nations from John Marshall’s opinion
in The Schooner Exchange41 through modern head of state immunity.  Modern
head of state immunity still echoes the law of nations principle that a court,
by exercising jurisdiction over a foreign official, may offend the respect for
sovereignty that is due to a foreign state.42
1. The Marshall Court
Head of state and foreign official immunity are closely linked to foreign
sovereign immunity, which arose out of principles drawn from the law of
nations.43  The doctrine of sovereign immunity can be traced to Chief Justice
Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange,44 which is regarded as the first
Anglo-American writing that contemplates immunity as a “basic requirement
of the law of nations.”45  In The Schooner Exchange, the plaintiffs filed a libel
action alleging that their ship had been forcibly taken while at sea by French
sailors acting under orders from Napoleon.46  Seven months later, when the
vessel was brought into port at Philadelphia due to adverse weather, the
plaintiffs sued to attach the ship.47  The Court dismissed the suit, holding
that the vessel was immune by virtue of it being a public ship in service of a
foreign sovereign.48
The Chief Justice’s holding was premised on principles of sovereignty
drawn from the law of nations, which granted each sovereign absolute and
39 2 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk. IV, ch. VII, § 108, at 386.
40 See supra notes 13–19 and accompanying text.
41 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
42 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Offi-
cials, and Human Rights Litigation, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 9, 13–14 (2009).
43 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 729, 825 (2012).
44 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116.
45 THEODORE R. GIUTTARI, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 27 (1970).
46 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 117.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 147.
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complete jurisdiction over all persons and things within its borders.49  There-
fore, any limitation on a nation’s exercise of jurisdiction must be by the sov-
ereign’s self-imposed consent, either explicit or implicit.50  Marshall
reasoned: “This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns,
and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse . . . have
given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood to wave
[sic] the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdic-
tion.”51  Marshall highlighted two relevant areas in which sovereign immu-
nity under the law of nations extended beyond the state itself: the individual
head of state52 and foreign ministers.53  Finally, Marshall noted that each
sovereign
is capable of destroying this implication . . . either by employing force, or by
subjecting such vessels to the ordinary tribunals.  But until such power be
exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be con-
sidered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction, which it
would be a breach of faith to exercise.54
After The Schooner Exchange, courts adhered to a doctrine of absolute
immunity, incorporating well-established principles of the law of nations.55
In 1897, the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez held that a U.S. citizen
could not recover from a Venezuelan military commander for unlawful
assault and detention in Venezuela, when that revolutionary party ultimately
succeeded and was recognized by the United States.56  The Court first articu-
lated the act of state doctrine,57 relying on principles of the law of nations.58
Further, the Court recognized that “[t]he immunity of individuals from suits
49 Id. at 136; see GIUTTARI, supra note 45, at 28.
50 The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
51 Id. at 137.
52 Id.  This immunity is embodied in “status” immunity.
53 Id. at 138.  Marshall reasoned that foreign ministers are different from private indi-
viduals, who do not have immunity, because they are “employed by him . . . [and] engaged
in national pursuits.” Id. at 144.  This immunity is embodied in modern day diplomatic
immunity.
54 Id. at 146.  Marshall may also have been influenced by the Attorney General’s
request for immunity, stating at the end of his opinion “that the fact might be disclosed to
the Court by the suggestion of the Attorney for the United States.” Id. at 147.
55 See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (holding that a
merchant ship owned by a foreign sovereign, even though used for commercial trading,
was immune from suit as a matter of sovereignty “in the absence of a treaty or statute of the
United States evincing a different purpose”); Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 217 (not-
ing that “U.S. courts applied a doctrine of absolute immunity . . . stemming from consider-
ations of both international law and international comity”).
56 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 253–54 (1897).
57 Id. at 252 (“[T]he courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within . . . their own States, in the exercise of governmental
authority, whether as civil officers or as military commanders . . . .”); see infra Section III.B.
58 See 1 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk. II, ch. IV, § 54, at 131 (“No foreign State may
inquire into the manner in which a sovereign rules, nor set itself up as judge of his con-
duct . . . .”); see also infra Section III.B.
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brought in foreign tribunals for acts done within their own States, in the
exercise of governmental authority, whether as civil officers or as military
commanders, must necessarily extend to the agents of governments ruling by
paramount force as matter of fact.”59
2. The Modern Doctrine: Executive Deference
By the late 1930s, however, courts began to defer to suggestions of
immunity given by the State Department.60  Deference to the Executive
reached its peak in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, in which the Court held that
in the absence of Executive guidance, courts must make immunity determi-
nations “in conformity to the principles accepted by the department of the
government charged with the conduct of our foreign relations.”61  The Court
reasoned further, “[i]t is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity
which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new
grounds which the government has not seen fit to recognize.”62  The Hoff-
man decision went further than any earlier decisions granting deference to
the Executive’s suggestions of immunity, instead holding that the Court must
give deference to the Executive’s policies.63  It is important, however, to note
the historical context in which the Court was electing to defer to the Execu-
tive on questions of sovereign immunity—it was an era that was giving nearly
exclusive control over foreign affairs to the Executive, acting unilaterally.64
In these opinions, the Court retained the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity, but reallocated immunity determinations from legal considera-
59 Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252 (emphasis added).
60 Compare Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (“That principle is that
courts may not so exercise their jurisdiction, by the seizure and detention of the property
of a friendly sovereign, as to embarrass the executive arm of the Government in con-
ducting foreign relations.  ‘In such cases the judicial department of this government fol-
lows the action of the political branch, and will not embarrass the latter by assuming an
antagonistic jurisdiction.’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 209 (1882))), and
Compania Espanola de Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938)
(“If the [immunity] claim is recognized and allowed by the executive branch of the govern-
ment, it is then the duty of the courts to release the vessel upon appropriate suggestion by
the Attorney General . . . .”), with S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 574, 576 (granting immunity
despite the State Department’s lower court argument that immunity should not be
granted).
61 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945).
62 Id.  The Court noted that “[i]t is enough that we find no persuasive ground for
allowing the immunity in this case, an important reason being that the State Department
has declined to recognize it.” Id. at 35 n.1.
63 See GIUTTARI, supra note 45, at 146–47.
64 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936) (“It is
important to bear in mind that we are here dealing [with] . . . the very delicate, plenary
and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations . . . . [I]f, in the maintenance of our international relations,
embarrassment . . . is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legis-
lation . . . must often accord to the President a degree of discretion . . . which would not be
admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.”); GIUTTARI, supra note 45, at 154–61.
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tions into political questions.65  As one author notes, “[t]he only basis for
justifying a dominant role for the executive in the determination of sovereign
immunity questions sprang essentially from its acknowledged primacy in for-
eign affairs generally and the immediate impact which judicial decisions on
sovereign immunity could have upon foreign policy interests.”66
The Executive, for more than a century and a half, had generally recom-
mended immunity for friendly sovereigns.67  In the face of growing disdain
for absolute sovereign immunity in light of foreign states increasingly engag-
ing in commercial enterprises, the State Department issued the Tate Letter
in 1952 endorsing the “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity.68  The
restrictive theory provides that “immunity of the sovereign is recognized with
regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect
to private acts (jure gestionis).”69  The Tate Letter closed by stating: “It is real-
ized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the courts but it is
felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sovereign immunity where
the executive has declined to do so.”70
The Supreme Court did adopt the restrictive theory, concluding that
“immunity is confined to suits involving the foreign sovereign’s public
acts.”71  The restrictive theory, however, encountered significant problems in
practice.72  First, because initial immunity determinations fell on the State
Department and were dispositive in the courts, foreign nations lobbied the
Department heavily, generating politically charged suggestions of immunity,
sometimes even in instances where immunity was unavailable under the
restrictive theory.73  Second, foreign nations did not always request sugges-
tions of immunity from the State Department, and the State Department
remained silent, leaving the courts to make independent immunity
determinations.74
In response to inconsistent immunity determinations, in 1976 Congress
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, codifying the restrictive theory
of foreign sovereign immunity.75  The FSIA shifted responsibility for sover-
65 See GIUTTARI, supra note 45, at 159.
66 See id. at 161.
67 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
68 Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Philip B.
Perlman, Acting Att’y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 984–85 (1952)
[hereinafter Letter from Jack B. Tate].
69 Id. at 984.  The Tate Letter acknowledges that several foreign jurisdictions and
scholars have endorsed the restrictive theory, and thus the shift in policy remains in step
with jurisdictions internationally. Id.
70 Id. at 985.




75 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codi-
fied as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012)).
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eign immunity determinations from the executive to the judicial branch.76  It
provided a comprehensive set of legal standards applicable to civil actions
against a “foreign state” or a “political subdivision[,] . . . agency or instrumen-
tality.”77  The FSIA provides that a foreign state is normally immune from
jurisdiction subject to certain exceptions, including waiver by the foreign sov-
ereign78 or commercial activities of the foreign sovereign.79  The Act pro-
vides that when an exception applies, “the foreign state shall be liable in the
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual.”80
Prior to enactment of the FSIA, suits against individual foreign officials
were few and far between.81  As suits against individual officials increased in
frequency, however, courts were required to decide whether the FSIA
applied to individuals.  A circuit split developed, with the majority of circuits
concluding that the FSIA applied to individual officials82 and a minority con-
cluding that the FSIA did not apply to individual officials.83
3. Returning to the “Common Law”: Samantar v. Yousuf
The Fourth Circuit widened the split.84  In Samantar, members of the
Isaaq clan sued Samantar, the former Prime Minister of Somalia, under the
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),
seeking redress for acts of torture and other human rights violations commit-
ted by the Somali military in the 1980s.85  Plaintiffs alleged not that Samantar
committed the violations himself, but that due to his roles as Minister of
Defense and Prime Minister, he gave tacit approval.86  Oppression of Somali
citizens ended in January 1991 with the collapse of the Barre regime, and
76 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
77 Id. §§ 1603–1604.
78 Id. § 1605(a)(1).
79 Id. § 1605(a)(2).
80 Id. § 1606.
81 See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 323 n.18 (2010) (noting that the State Depart-
ment made only six individual immunity determinations out of a total of 110 total deci-
sions rendered from 1952 to 1977).
82 See, e.g., In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008)
(concluding that acts committed in an individual’s official capacity in a sovereign govern-
ment must be analyzed under the FSIA), abrogated by Samantar, 560 U.S. 305; Keller v. Cent.
Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 2002) (same), abrogated by Samantar, 560 U.S.
305; Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A., 182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir.
1999) (same), abrogated by Samantar, 560 U.S. 305; El-Fadl v. Cent. Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d
668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same), abrogated by Samantar, 560 U.S. 305; Chuidian v. Phil.
Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), abrogated by Samantar, 560 U.S.
305.
83 See, e.g., Yousuf v. Samantar, 552 F.3d 371, 381 (4th Cir. 2009) (concluding that the
FSIA does not apply to immunity determinations for individual foreign officials), aff’d, 560
U.S. 305 (2010); Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 881–82 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).
84 Yousuf, 552 F.3d at 381.
85 Id. at 373–75.
86 Id. at 374.
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Samantar fled to Virginia where the plaintiffs found him and brought suit.87
The Fourth Circuit adopted the minority view that the FSIA’s “agency or
instrumentality” language did not apply to individuals, and therefore the dis-
trict court could exercise jurisdiction over Samantar.88
The Supreme Court intervened to resolve the circuit split in its 2010
decision in Samantar v. Yousuf, concluding unanimously that the FSIA did
not apply to individual foreign officials.89  The Supreme Court opined, how-
ever, that “[e]ven if a suit is not governed by the Act, it may still be barred by
foreign sovereign immunity under the common law.”90  The Court empha-
sized “the narrowness of [its] holding,” acknowledging that Samantar may be
able to assert several other defenses beyond the FSIA.91  The Supreme Court,
however, refused to give any content to the “common law,” instead reserving
the issue for the district court on remand.92
B. Act of State Doctrine
Distinct from sovereign immunity, yet still a product of the law of
nations, is the act of state doctrine.  The act of state doctrine is not a jurisdic-
tional defense like immunity, but rather is a binding rule of decision that
precludes U.S. courts from evaluating the propriety, or lack thereof, of acts
undertaken by a foreign sovereign within its own territory.93  Vattel, in The
Law of Nations, explained that “[i]t clearly follows from the liberty and inde-
pendence of Nations that each has the right to govern itself as it thinks
proper, and that no one of them has the least right to interfere in the govern-
ment of another.”94  Accordingly, “[n]o foreign State may inquire into the
manner in which a sovereign rules, nor set itself up as judge of his conduct,
nor force him to make any change in his administration.”95  Thus, during the
Framing, when foreign affairs powers were allocated by the Constitution to
87 Id.
88 Id. at 383.
89 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325 (2010).
90 Id. at 324.
91 Id. at 325–26.  The Supreme Court offered a procedural defense.  The foreign state
itself may be a “required party,” such that “disposing of the action in the [foreign state’s]
absence may . . . as a practical matter impair or impede the [state]’s ability to protect [its]
interest.” Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).  If the foreign state itself is immune, the suit could not be brought against the individ-
ual. Id. at 324–25.  Second, the Court concluded that “some actions against an official in
his official capacity should be treated as actions against the foreign state itself, as the state
is the real party in interest,” thus preventing liability from attaching to the individual. Id.
at 325.
92 Id. at 325–26; see infra Part III.
93 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1964).
94 1 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk. II, ch. IV, § 54, at 131.
95 Id. § 55.
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Congress and the Executive, it would have been understood that actions
taken by foreign sovereigns were not subject to judgment by U.S. courts.96
The first case acknowledging the act of state doctrine was Underhill v.
Hernandez.97  Underhill, a U.S. citizen who created a waterworks system and
machinery repair business in Venezuela, was detained by General Hernandez
and denied a passport.98  The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of
Underhill’s claim against Hernandez, holding that “[t]he acts complained of
were the acts of a military commander representing the authority of the revo-
lutionary party as a government, which afterwards . . . was recognized by the
United States.”99  The Court explained that this injury must be remedied
through powers delegated to the political branches:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory.
Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the
means open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.100
The Court even extended the protection of territorial sovereignty not
only to the state itself but to the state’s de facto officials as well:
Nor can the principle be confined to lawful or recognized governments,
or to cases where redress can manifestly be had through public channels.
The immunity of individuals from suits brought in foreign tribunals for acts
done within their own States, in the exercise of governmental authority,
whether as civil officers or as military commanders, must necessarily extend
to the agents of governments ruling by paramount force as matter of fact.101
The Underhill Court not only relied on the law of nations’ conception of
sovereignty, but “also the Constitution’s allocation of recognition and war
powers to the political branches by requiring courts to respect the territorial
sovereignty of recognized foreign states.”102  Because the United States had
recognized the Venezuelan government, “judicial scrutiny of its acts would
have contradicted recognition by denying the territorial sovereignty that rec-
ognition acknowledged.”103
96 The law of nations recognized an exception to the general prohibition of judging
the conduct of foreign sovereigns: when a foreign people justly revolt against their sover-
eign such that the ties between the sovereign and his people are severed.  Foreign states
can assist the side they believed to be “upholding the just cause.” Id. § 56.
97 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
98 Id. at 251.
99 Id. at 254.
100 Id. at 252.  For example, such redress could be achieved through diplomatic negoti-
ations or declaration of war. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
422–23 (1964) (“[T]he usual method for an individual to seek relief is to exhaust local
remedies and then repair to the executive authorities of his own state to persuade them to
champion his claim in diplomacy or before an international tribunal.”).
101 Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
102 Bellia and Clark, supra note 43, at 805.
103 Id.
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The act of state doctrine continued to preclude plaintiffs from bringing
suit for actions committed by foreign sovereigns in their own territory.104
Judicial application of the act of state doctrine was ultimately entrenched in
the Supreme Court’s 1964 decision in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.105
When faltering diplomatic relations with Cuba resulted in the United States
lowering its Cuban sugar quota, the Cuban government responded by pass-
ing a legislative enactment that allowed the Cuban government to “national-
ize by forced expropriation property or enterprises in which American
nationals had an interest.”106  A controversy resulted over which party was
entitled to the proceeds—the American nationals or the Cuban govern-
ment—with the Cuban government relying on the act of state doctrine to
protect its ability to exact a taking without compensation.107  The Supreme
Court held for Cuba, concluding that
the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of property
within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recog-
nized by this country at the time of suit, in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the
complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international law.108
Sabbatino tied the act of state doctrine to a general understanding of the
Constitution’s allocation of powers109—in particular, the Executive’s recog-
nition power—and ensured that, in the absence of Congress or the President
independently exercising one of their own constitutionally delegated powers,
the judiciary would not unilaterally violate a foreign nation’s perfect right to
territorial sovereignty.110  Although the act of state of doctrine is not com-
pelled by international law today, the Court held that “the act of state doc-
trine is a principle of decision binding on federal and state courts,” whose
“continuing vitality depends on its capacity to reflect the proper distribution
104 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“[T]he courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory.” (quoting Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“The effect of [recognition by the President]
was to validate, so far as this country is concerned, all acts of the [foreign] [g]overnment
here involved from the commencement of its existence.”); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246
U.S. 304, 309 (1918) (“[Underhill] requires only that, when it is made to appear that the
foreign government has acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the
details of such action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted
by our courts as a rule for their decision.”); Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 304
(1918) (“To permit the validity of the acts of one sovereign State to be reexamined and
perhaps condemned by the courts of another would very certainly ‘imperil the amicable
relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.’”).
105 376 U.S. 398.
106 Id. at 401.
107 Id. at 400–01.
108 Id. at 428.
109 Id. at 423 (“The act of state doctrine . . . arises out of the basic relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers.”).
110 Bellia & Clark, supra note 43, at 813.
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of functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government
on matters bearing upon foreign affairs.”111  Although the Sabbatino Court
explicitly mentioned the Executive’s power, the act of state doctrine is just as
much bound up with Congress’s foreign affairs powers.  In order to reflect
the delegation of foreign affairs powers to the political branches, the judici-
ary should refrain from passing judgment on the acts of a foreign sovereign
done within its own territory.112  The act of state doctrine should be applied
in order for the judiciary to avoid infringing on the Executive’s power to
confer the privileges of recognition and on Congress’s many powers to affect
U.S. foreign relations.
III. THE JUS COGENS “EXCEPTION”
The foregoing Part described the development of individual immunity
determinations and the act of state doctrine—two doctrines that arose out of
the law of nations and were, as this Note argues, incorporated into the alloca-
tion of foreign relations powers to the political branches.113  After the
Supreme Court’s decision in Samantar, which concluded that Congress had
not exercised its foreign affairs powers in the context of individual immunity,
the case was remanded to determine whether immunity under the “common
law” was available.114  The Fourth Circuit concluded that Samantar was not
eligible for immunity under the common law, in particular because the acts
alleged against him were violations of jus cogens norms and thus immunity
was abrogated.115  However laudable the vindication of human rights may be,
the Fourth Circuit’s decision announcing a judicially created jus cogens excep-
tion usurps its limited role in foreign relations.  By abrogating immunity in
cases of jus cogens violations under the “common law,” federal courts would
be infringing on the foreign affairs powers constitutionally delegated to the
political branches.  This Part will discuss the disposition of the lower courts in
Samantar after remand and argue that elimination by the judiciary of immu-
nity for jus cogens violations is improper.  Because foreign sovereign immunity
was impliedly incorporated into the Constitution through the delegation of
foreign relations powers to Congress and the President, U.S. courts are an
inappropriate venue for declaring a categorical abrogation of immunity that
the political branches have not authorized through the exercise of one of
their corresponding powers.
111 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427–28.
112 See Bellia & Clark, supra note 43, at 817–18.
113 See supra Part I.
114 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010).
115 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 778 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 897
(2014).
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A. Samantar on Remand
On remand, the district court rejected Samantar’s claims of immunity
under the common law, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.116  Samantar raised
two immunity claims: (1) head of state immunity, because the conduct
alleged occurred while he was Prime Minister, and (2) foreign official immu-
nity, because the alleged conduct was “taken in the course and scope of his
official duties.”117  The State Department on remand recommended that
Samantar not be granted immunity on two grounds: first, the United States
does not recognize a Somalian government that could claim immunity on his
behalf,118 and second, that Samantar’s residence in the United States indi-
cates his acquiescence to the jurisdiction of American courts.119  The Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that Samantar was not entitled
to immunity under the common law.120  First, the court attempted to discern
the level of deference granted to State Department immunity suggestions,
distinguishing between head of state immunity and official acts immunity.121
On issues of head of state immunity, the court reasoned, “consistent with the
Executive’s constitutionally delegated powers and the historical practice of
the courts, we conclude that the State Department’s pronouncement as to
head of state immunity is entitled to absolute deference.”122  On questions of
conduct-based immunity, however, to which the recognition power does not
quite as logically extend, the court concluded that the State Department’s
determination “is not controlling, but it carries substantial weight in [the
court’s] analysis.”123
Finally, the court concluded that Samantar was not entitled to foreign
official immunity under the common law, drawing on principles of interna-
tional law, domestic immunity law, and the judgment of the State
Department.124
116 Id. at 766.
117 Id. at 767.
118 Unfortunately for Mr. Samantar, this fact may be conclusive as to his eligibility for
immunity.  Sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine apply to sovereigns recognized
at the time of suit.  Where a sovereign is not recognized, the concerns raised by adjudicat-
ing in U.S. courts—interference with foreign relations and territorial sovereignty—are no
longer applicable.  The President has exercised his power not to recognize a government
in Somalia, and therefore Mr. Samantar does not have a sovereign to whom he can tie his
immunity claim.  However, the Fourth Circuit’s holding that any allegations of jus cogens
violations abrogate immunity presents considerable concern and should be addressed. Id.
The Supreme Court, though, denied certiorari to reevaluate Mr. Samantar’s claim after
remand.  Samantar v. Yousuf, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2014) (mem.) (denying certiorari).
119 Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 767.
120 Id. at 766.
121 Id. at 768–69.
122 Id. at 772.  The Executive power the court relied upon is the power to “receive
Ambassadors and other public Ministers,” which includes the power to recognize foreign
heads of state. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
123 Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 773.
124 Id. at 773, 778.
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[A] foreign official may assert immunity for official acts performed within
the scope of his duty, but not for private acts where “the officer purports to
act as an individual and not as an official, [such that] a suit directed against
that action is not a suit against the sovereign.”  A foreign official . . . will
therefore not be able to assert this immunity for private acts that are not
arguably attributable to the state.125
The court explained that the allegations against Samantar violated jus
cogens norms of international law, which are “norm[s] accepted and recog-
nized by the international community . . . as a norm from which no deroga-
tion is permitted.”126  Therefore, by definition, jus cogens violations are “acts
that are not officially authorized by the Sovereign.”127  The court held that
foreign officials “are not entitled to foreign official immunity for jus cogens
violations, even if the acts were performed in the defendant’s official capac-
ity.”128  The court concluded that because the allegations against Samantar
included violations of jus cogens norms, which by definition cannot be author-
ized by a foreign sovereign, he was not entitled to immunity.129
By holding that violations of jus cogens norms of international law cannot
be shielded from suit under head of state immunity, the Fourth Circuit
diverged from other circuits and opened former foreign officials to a vast
array of personal liability.130
125 Id. at 775 (alteration in original) (quoting Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d
1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010)).
126 Id. (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
127 Id. at 776.
128 Id. at 777.
129 Id. at 778.  The court also acknowledged that the State Department’s recommenda-
tion against immunity added substantial weight in favor of denying immunity. Id. at
778–79.
130 In Giraldo v. Drummond Co., the District Court for the District of Columbia found
instructive the reasoning in pre-Samantar D.C. Circuit decisions, despite the fact that they
were decided under the now-inapplicable FSIA.  808 F. Supp. 2d 247, 250 (D.D.C. 2011),
aff’d, 493 F. App’x 106 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam).  The court rejected the plaintiff’s
argument that former President Uribe “acted within his official capacity but illegally, and
hence such unlawful acts were outside the scope of his official duties by definition.” Id. at
251.  The court ultimately concluded that jus cogens violations remained within the scope
of an official’s capacity. Id. The D.C. Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion, stating that
“mere allegations [of jus cogens violations] were insufficient to defeat former President
Uribe’s immunity.”  Giraldo v. Drummond Co., 493 F. App’x 106, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(per curiam).  Such a conclusion is consistent with pre-Samantar holdings. See Matar v.
Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009) (“A claim premised on the violation of jus cogens
does not withstand foreign sovereign immunity.”); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir.
2004) (holding that the executive branch’s determination that an official was entitled to
immunity is conclusive, notwithstanding any jus cogens violations).
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B. The Failure of the Jus Cogens “Exception”
The Supreme Court has incorporated the “restrictive theory” of foreign
sovereign immunity131—meaning that immunity does not extend to private
or commercial acts—yet it does not follow that what constitutes an official’s
public acts ought to be construed narrowly.  Because governments can only
act through individuals, a suit against a foreign official for conduct taken in
his official capacity is akin to a suit against the sovereign.132  Further, interna-
tional law indicates “that jus cogens violations committed by officials are gov-
ernmental rather than private acts.”133  By denying the protections of
immunity to foreign officials when they have engaged in a governmental act
in their official capacity within their own territory, courts are encroaching on
the powers of the other branches to determine when to infringe upon
another sovereign’s “perfect rights.”  Failure to recognize the immunity of
foreign officials has wide-ranging constitutional and practical ramifications—
especially because it involves the United States imposing civil liability on for-
eign officials for a plethora of human rights violations.  The judiciary should
err on the side of broad recognition of the rights of foreign officials to act in
their official capacities, absent authorization from the political branches to
abrogate such protections, if the proper allocation of foreign affairs powers is
to be upheld.
1. Usurpation of Constitutional Allocation of Power
As noted earlier, Congress and the President are given broad foreign
relations powers.134  At the Founding, denying an official immunity from suit
would have been just cause for war.135  Because of the foreign relations impli-
cations associated with denial of immunity, the Framers’ allocation of foreign
affairs powers to the political branches reserved to those branches the power
to derogate from the “perfect rights” of foreign sovereigns.136  Therefore,
when the judiciary denies immunity absent authorization from a political
branch, it usurps the constitutionally delegated power of the political
branches to determine U.S. foreign relations.  To preserve the proper alloca-
131 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).  Further, the
restrictive theory has also been, at some point, endorsed by both political branches. See
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-582, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012)); Letter from Jack B. Tate, supra note 68.
In its adoption of the restrictive theory, the Court is at least acting with some indication of
authorization from the political branches—whether the authorization is constitutionally
sound is beyond the scope of this Note.
132 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 10–11; see also 2 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk.
IV, ch. VII, § 108, at 386 (“[The prince’s] dignity alone, and the regard due to the Nation which
he represents and governs . . . exempts him from the jurisdiction of [another] country.”
(emphasis added)).
133 Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 245 (emphasis added).
134 See supra Part I.
135 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
136 See supra Part I.
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tion of powers, U.S. courts should err on the side of over-recognition of the
rights of foreign sovereigns and rely on the law of nations to provide default
principles.137  Courts should be hesitant to adjudicate a suit against a foreign
official—thereby interfering with the political branches’ ability to conduct
foreign affairs—absent express authorization to do so.
Congress has never expressly acknowledged a jus cogens exception to
immunity; in fact, no such exception exists in the FSIA.138  Although con-
gressional inaction is not appropriate evidence of congressional intent, given
the particular circumstances of foreign official immunity, congressional inac-
tion should urge courts to exercise judicial restraint to avoid infringing on
authority reserved to Congress.  The executive branch also has broad foreign
relations powers, which are an outgrowth of the recognition power.  When
the executive branch recognizes a foreign state—as is its prerogative—the
implication is that the executive branch confers upon that sovereign the
many rights and protections that accompany territorial sovereignty.139
Even when a recognized foreign sovereign abuses its power and commits
human rights violations, its status as a sovereign should not be infringed
lightly.  Because jus cogens violations are governmental acts in the exercise of
a sovereign’s police power, “however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may
be, a foreign state’s exercise of [that power] has long been understood for
purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.”140
Because a sovereign state can only act through its officials, when an individ-
ual acts in his official capacity—even in committing a human rights abuse—
he is engaging in a sovereign act that implicates the foreign state’s territorial
sovereignty.  By denying immunity to officials who have committed jus cogens
violations while acting in their official capacity, the judicial branch under-
mines the Executive’s ability to recognize and thereby confer full sovereign
authority upon a foreign state and its officials.
Because the law of nations was the backdrop upon which the Constitu-
tion was drafted, the Framers—in allocating foreign affairs powers to Con-
gress and the Executive—reserved to the political branches the ability to
derogate from recognition of the perfect rights of sovereigns.141  Therefore,
the judicial branch, in order to preserve this constitutional structure, should
not deviate from the perfect rights of sovereigns unless and until a political
branch has exercised its power.
137 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
138 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 11 (“[T]he FSIA appears to contain no
exception for international human rights cases.”).
139 Defining what rights accompany territorial sovereignty should be informed by the
law of nations and understood to be incorporated into the powers of the political
branches. See supra Part I.
140 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993).
141 See supra Part I.
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2. Reciprocity and International Cohesion
Each sovereign has the power to infringe the perfect rights of other
nations—however, upholding these rights is central to maintaining peaceful
relations among countries.142  Recognition of foreign sovereign immunity
and its extension to foreign officials is not an obligation on any other foreign
nation, but is a “matter of grace and comity.”143  Comity is “neither a matter
of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other.”144  When the United States denies immunity to a foreign
official against the will of that foreign state, the United States jeopardizes its
ability to have immunity conferred on American officials in the future.  By
concluding that “officials from other countries are not entitled to foreign
official immunity for jus cogens violations, even if the acts were performed in
the defendant’s official capacity,”145 the Fourth Circuit creates a future reci-
procity problem.146  As a pragmatic matter, the courts, when acting alone,
should be hesitant to compromise the ability of the United States’ sovereign
rights to be recognized in courts abroad.
Further, “[a] court that interprets immunity broadly will not violate [cus-
tomary international law], whereas a court that interprets immunity narrowly
may.”147  Under international law, U.S. courts remain in compliance by
applying a broad interpretation of immunity, even while adhering to the
“restrictive” theory of sovereign immunity.  By construing immunity broadly,
courts also avoid opening the floodgates to human rights litigation, wherein
“cases . . . might well be brought by the victims of all the ruthless military
juntas, presidents-for-life, and murderous dictators of the world.”148  The
courts should leave resolution of international human rights violations to
142 Bellia & Clark, Political Branches, supra note 15, at 1799; see also Louis Henkin, The
President and International Law, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 930, 931 (1986) (“In principle, every state
has the power—I do not say the right—to violate international law and obligation and to
suffer the consequences.”).
143 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
144 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 409 (1964) (quoting Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 777 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 897
(2014).
146 Imagine, for example, that a foreign state or international tribunal determines that
there is a jus cogens norm against all capital punishment.  In fact, such a norm does exist for
capital punishment of juvenile offenders. See Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285,
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 62/02, ¶ 85 (2002), available at http://cidh.org/an
nualrep/2002eng/USA.12285.htm (“[T]he Commission considers that the United States is
bound by a norm of jus cogens not to impose capital punishment on individuals who com-
mitted their crimes when they had not yet reached 18 years of age.”).  It is difficult to
imagine that the United States would approve foreign courts finding an American official
civilly liable for damages arising out of the capital punishment of an adult offender.
147 Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 252.
148 Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515 F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Princz v. Fed.
Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1175 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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international tribunals and the political branches, all of which are bodies
more fully equipped to handle foreign relations and international human
rights violations.  By so doing, U.S. courts protect the constitutional alloca-
tion of foreign affairs powers to Congress and the Executive and also avoid
violating customary international law.
IV. SOLUTION: STATUS IMMUNITY, CONDUCT IMMUNITY, AND ACTS OF STATE
The status of head of state and foreign official immunity is no doubt in
disarray as courts search for the content of the federal “common law,”
alluded to in Samantar, that comprises foreign official immunity.149
Through careful consideration of the relevant constitutional powers allo-
cated to each branch of the federal government, as well as the values
espoused in the Supreme Court’s development of foreign sovereign immu-
nity and the act of state doctrine, a doctrinal framework emerges that will
preserve the constitutional separation of powers, promote restraint of the
apolitical branch in delicate foreign affairs questions, and avoid reciprocity
concerns by respecting sovereign immunity’s importance to international
comity.  This Part proposes a framework for courts to utilize prior to hearing
a suit against a foreign official.  First, the court should evaluate whether the
official has “status-based” immunity;150 second, the court should evaluate
whether the individual official has “conduct-based” immunity;151 and third, if
the court decides there is no immunity bar to jurisdiction, it should apply the
act of state doctrine when suit is brought against an official of a recognized
sovereign for governmental acts occurring within the sovereign territory.
Courts should apply each step of this framework separately.  By broadly con-
struing the inability of U.S. courts to enter judgment against foreign officials,
courts will uphold the proper allocation of foreign affairs powers—and the
ability to infringe sovereign rights—to the political branches.152
A. Status-Based Immunity
Courts should first apply status-based immunity.  Status-based immunity
protects a sitting head of state or high-ranking foreign official153 from legal
consequences purely by nature of his position in a foreign government.154
This immunity, however, “terminates with the office.”155
149 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 323–24 (2010).
150 See infra Section IV.A.
151 See infra Section IV.B.
152 See infra Section IV.C.
153 The criteria for determining who exactly constitutes a “high-ranking foreign offi-
cial” for purposes of status-based immunity is beyond the scope of this Note; however, it
would be left to the courts to develop the doctrine.
154 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 769, 773 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
897 (2014).
155 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 18.
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Status-based immunity arises out of the law of nations.  Vattel wrote that
a prince’s “dignity alone, and the regard due to the Nation which he repre-
sents and governs . . . exempts him from the jurisdiction of the country.”156
This understanding was impliedly incorporated into the Constitution, and
the power to deviate was expressly granted to the political branches by alloca-
tion of their foreign affairs powers.157  This conception of immunity was then
recognized by the Supreme Court in The Schooner Exchange.158  Chief Justice
Marshall expressed that “the person of the sovereign” is protected “from
arrest or detention within a foreign territory,” because he cannot be “under-
stood as intending to subject himself to a jurisdiction incompatible with his
dignity, and the dignity of his nation.”159
Although the existence of monarchs has been curtailed in contemporary
governments, the principle that the dignity of the nation warrants exemption
from jurisdiction should be extended to modern foreign leaders.  Because
governments can only act through individuals, modern status-based immu-
nity is justified by its ability to ensure that officials can perform their duties
unhindered and are respected as embodiments of the sovereign.160  In fact,
“[t]he rationales for granting status immunity are threefold: ‘to ensure the
effective performance of [the officials’] functions on behalf of their respec-
tive States’; to facilitate ‘the proper functioning of the network of mutual
inter-State relations’; and to preserve the sovereign equality and dignity of the
state itself, which the official embodies.”161
While the importance of status-based immunity has been repeatedly
underscored, the question then becomes: How should U.S. courts determine
whether to grant status-based immunity?  American courts have generally
deferred to the executive branch’s determination on whether to assume juris-
diction.162  In fact, Verlinden opines that courts do so because sovereign
156 2 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk. IV, ch. VII, § 108, at 386.
157 See supra Part I.
158 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
159 Id. at 137.
160 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 2012), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 897
(2014).
161 Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 234–35 (emphasis added) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 53 (Feb. 14); Int’l Law Comm’n, Immunity of State
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction: Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat,
60th Sess., May 5–June 6, July 7–Aug. 8, 2008, ¶ 148, UN Doc. A/CN.4/596 (Mar. 31,
2008)); see also Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 769 (noting that the rationale for head of state immunity
“is to promote comity among nations by ensuring that leaders can perform their duties
without being subject to detention, arrest or embarrassment in a foreign country’s legal
system” (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th Cir. 1987) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)).
162 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“[T]his Court
consistently has deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular, those of
the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction over actions against foreign sover-
eigns and their instrumentalities.”); supra subsection II.A.2.
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immunity is “not a restriction imposed by the Constitution.”163 Verlinden’s
conclusion, however, fails to fully capture the way in which sovereign immu-
nity is a constitutional requirement.  Although sovereign immunity was not
explicitly written into the Constitution, it was impliedly incorporated through
the delegation of the President’s and Congress’s foreign affairs powers.164
When framing the constitutional foreign affairs powers, absolute immunity
for the person of the sovereign was widely understood; thus it is solely within
the province of the political branches—not the judiciary—to determine
when such immunity should be abrogated.165
Status-based immunity is most closely linked to the Executive’s recogni-
tion power, as it depends on the official’s status as the head of state (or high-
ranking foreign official) of a recognized sovereign at the time of suit.  Thus,
the modern practice of deferring to the executive branch on questions of
immunity does not raise constitutional concerns, provided the courts rely on
the Executive insofar as it answers the appropriate question.  The question
the executive branch should answer is not whether a foreign individual is
entitled to status-based immunity, but rather, whether that individual is recog-
nized as the head of state of a foreign sovereign.  The answer to this question
was dispositive in United States v. Noriega, where the court denied head of state
immunity “because the United States government never recognized Noriega
as Panama’s legitimate, constitutional ruler.”166
When determining whether a head of state or foreign official has status-
based immunity, the inquiry courts should undertake is whether the Execu-
tive recognizes the sovereign nation and recognizes the official as a sitting
foreign official or head of state at the time of suit.  If both conditions are
present, the sitting official should be accorded head of state immunity in
order to uphold the Executive’s power to confer the rights attendant to terri-
torial sovereignty upon a foreign state.
B. Conduct-Based Immunity
Distinct from status-based immunity is conduct-based immunity, which
should be addressed as a separate inquiry.  Conduct-based immunity applies
to government officials, “both during and after” holding office, but only for
their “official acts.”167
Unlike status-based immunity, the law of nations does not provide a cor-
responding parallel for conduct-based immunity, as Vattel’s analysis pre-
sumed sovereignty rested in one “prince.”168  Yet the law of nations insisted
on broad recognition of immunity for the person of the sovereign in order to
respect the “dignity” of the foreign state.169  The allocation of foreign affairs
163 Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486.
164 Bellia & Clark, supra note 43, at 731–32, 827.
165 See supra Part I; supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text.
166 117 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (11th Cir. 1997).
167 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 42, at 18.
168 See 2 VATTEL, supra note 16, bk. IV, ch. VII, § 108, at 386.
169 See id.
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powers was designed with the understanding of absolute immunity.  Modern
developments, however, indicate that both political branches have, at least
impliedly, authorized deviation from this absolute understanding when for-
eign actions are private in nature.170  Thus, courts, by adopting the “restric-
tive theory,” should not be understood as deviating from the perfect rights of
sovereigns in a way that undermines allocation of powers.  In applying the
tenets of the restrictive theory, however, courts should construe conduct-
based immunity broadly to avoid any violation of perfect sovereign rights that
the political branches would not authorize.
Conduct-based immunity posits that
a foreign official may assert immunity for official acts performed within the
scope of his duty, but not for private acts where “the officer purports to act
as an individual and not as an official, [such that] a suit directed against that
action is not a suit against the sovereign.”171
Under this conception of conduct-based immunity, acts undertaken by a
foreign official are granted conduct-based immunity when “the effect of exer-
cising jurisdiction [over the individual] would be to enforce a rule of law
against the state.”172
The question of the executive branch’s involvement in conduct-based
immunity analysis should be different than that of status-based immunity.
Courts have, rightfully, adopted deference to the Executive on questions of
status-based immunity—despite the fact that this adoption has not been
cogently linked to the recognition power.  But, for conduct-based immunity,
courts should resist similarly adopting absolute deference.173
170 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (2012)); Letter from Jack B. Tate,
supra note 68.  This Note takes no position on whether the branches acted constitutionally
in abrogating this understanding, but merely argues that the courts, by adopting the
restrictive theory, had some indication of authorization from the political branches.
171 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Chuidian v. Phil. Nat’l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Samantar
v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2014).
172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 66(f) (1965); see also Samantar, 560 U.S. at 321 (quoting this same passage from the
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States).
173 See Chimène I. Keitner, The Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 14 GREEN BAG
2D 61, 72–75 (2010).  Professor Keitner found that between the Tate Letter and enactment
of the FSIA, the State Department only issued determinations in four conduct-based immu-
nity cases “of individual defendants.” Id. at 72 (citing Samantar, 560 U.S. at 323; Sovereign
Immunity Decisions of the Department of State: May 1952 to January 1977, 1977 DIG. U.S.
PRAC. INT’L L. 1017 app. at 1020); see supra note 81 and accompanying text.  Of these four
cases, which never went beyond a district court, two of the final court decisions could not
be located, and the other two granted immunity.  Keitner, supra, at 72–73.  This leads to
her conclusion that “[t]here is thus no consistent, well-settled practice from which to infer
a standard of absolute deference to the Executive on questions of conduct-based immu-
nity,” and “[t]here is also a scant record from which to derive ‘the principles accepted’ by
the Executive as governing claims to conduct-based immunity when the State Department”
is silent. Id. at 73.
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The key question to be answered when determining whether an individ-
ual is entitled to conduct-based immunity is whether his actions are imputa-
ble to the state, such that denying immunity for his acts would be akin to
permitting a suit against the sovereign.  Because a government can only act
through individuals, “any act performed by the individual as an act of the
State enjoys the immunity which the State enjoys.”174  Although the exact
limitations of conduct-based immunity have not been clearly defined, the
Fourth Circuit has ruled that it does not extend to violations of jus cogens
norms of international law—namely, atrocities such as genocide, extrajudi-
cial killing, and torture.175  The Fourth Circuit reasoned that “jus cogens viola-
tions may well be committed under color of law and, in that sense, constitute
acts performed in the course of the foreign official’s employment by the Sov-
ereign.  However, . . . jus cogens violations are, by definition, acts that are not
officially authorized by the Sovereign.”176  This conclusion, though, rests on
questionable legal precedent.177
For courts analyzing conduct-based immunity, the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity provides that “immunity is confined to suits involving the
foreign sovereign’s public acts, and does not extend to cases arising out of a
foreign state’s strictly commercial acts.”178  Under the “doctrine of imputabil-
ity” to the state, an individual foreign official should be entitled to immunity
174 HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 455 (2d ed. 2008).
175 Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 775–76.
176 Id.
177 The Fourth Circuit cites three cases for its assertion that “American courts have
generally . . . conclud[ed] that jus cogens violations are not legitimate official acts and
therefore do not merit foreign official immunity.” Id. at 776.  This “general conclusion”
arrived at by the Fourth Circuit is “supported” by Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina,
which states, “International law does not recognize an act that violates jus cogens as a
sovereign act.” Id. (quoting Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 718
(9th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The next sentence in Siderman reads:
“A state’s violation of the jus cogens norm prohibiting official torture therefore would not
be entitled to the immunity afforded by international law.” Siderman, 965 F.2d at 718
(emphasis added).  It is important to note that the immunity afforded by international law
is not coextensive with the immunity afforded by the allocation of powers, which requires a
political branch to authorize any abrogation of absolute immunity. Siderman acknowl-
edged as much, stating that “we do not write on a clean slate.” Id.  Another case cited for
support by the Fourth Circuit is Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, which relied on Siderman and stated
in dicta that acts in “violation[ ] of jus cogens norms . . . cannot constitute official sover-
eign acts.” Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 776 (alteration in original) (quoting Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC,
487 F.3d 1193, 1209–10 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  A third case
giving support to the Fourth Circuit’s creation of a jus cogens exception to immunity is
Judge Cudahy’s dissent in Enahoro. Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 777 (quoting Enahoro v. Abubakar,
408 F.3d 877, 893 (7th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., dissenting in part)).  The Fourth Circuit’s
conclusion also has questionable legal support in the international community. See Brad-
ley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 243 (“International tribunals have yet to take a definitive
position on whether there is a jus cogens exception to foreign official immunity in civil
cases.”).
178 Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
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for his official public acts that are attributable to the state.179  In fact, schol-
ars have noted an emerging trend “that jus cogens violations committed by
officials are governmental rather than private acts.”180  The Fourth Circuit
conceded that “jus cogens violations” can “be committed under color of law
and, in that sense, constitute acts performed in the course of the foreign official’s
employment by the Sovereign.”181  Had the conduct-based immunity inquiry
ended there, it would have had support from the Second, Seventh, and D.C.
Circuits.182
In addition, the Supreme Court—although interpreting within the con-
text of the FSIA—has stated that
the intentional conduct alleged here . . . boils down to abuse of the power of
its police by the Saudi Government, and however monstrous such abuse
undoubtedly may be, a foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police has
long been understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sover-
eign in nature.183
Rationalizing courts’ refusal to entertain suits purely because the allega-
tions constitute violations of international law, the D.C. Circuit in Belhas v.
Ya’alon, although interpreting the FSIA, concluded:
[S]omething more nearly express is wanted before we impute to the Con-
gress an intention that the federal courts assume jurisdiction over the count-
less human rights cases that might well be brought by the victims of all the
ruthless military juntas, presidents-for-life, and murderous dictators of the
world, from Idi Amin to Mao Zedong.184
Although the D.C. Circuit clearly decided Belhas on grounds of statutory
interpretation of the FSIA and its lack of an enumerated jus cogens exception,
the court’s rationale is instructive for development of conduct-based immu-
nity—namely, that the creation of such a broad exception to immunity by the
judicial branch would invade the province of the political branches who are
charged with managing foreign relations.  Neither Congress nor the Execu-
tive has taken the position that allegations of jus cogens violations preclude
immunity, and thus, in order to preserve the powers of the political branches
179 See FOX, supra note 174, at 455.
180 Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 245.
181 Yousuf, 699 F.3d at 775–76 (emphasis added).  The Seventh Circuit has noted that
“jus cogens norms do not require Congress (or any government) to create jurisdiction.”
Sampson v. Fed. Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1152 (7th Cir. 2001).
182 See Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9, 15 (2d Cir. 2009) (“A claim premised on the viola-
tion of jus cogens does not withstand foreign sovereign immunity.”); Belhas v. Ya’alon, 515
F.3d 1279, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding that courts will not carve “another” jus cogens
exception into the FSIA, because Congress would have to expressly intend the federal
courts to have “jurisdiction over the countless human rights cases” (quoting Princz v. Fed.
Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1175 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 627 (7th Cir. 2004) (concluding that there is no
blanket exception to immunity even where jus cogens violations are alleged).
183 Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) (emphasis added).
184 Belhas, 515 F.3d at 1287 (quoting Princz, 26 F.3d at 1174 n.1) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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to control foreign relations, the Constitution requires courts to err on the side
of over-recognition of the rights of foreign sovereigns, unless and until a
political branch acts.
Where a foreign official acts on behalf of his sovereign and within his
official capacity, even if his actions violate a jus cogens norm, he has engaged
in a public, sovereign act attributable to the state.  Therefore his conduct
should be entitled to conduct-based immunity from civil liability in U.S.
courts.  By construing broadly what constitutes an “official public act” for pur-
poses of granting conduct-based immunity, the judicial branch avoids open-
ing the floodgates to international human rights litigation and upholds the
power of the political branches—Congress in particular—to determine in
what context the perfect sovereign rights of foreign states should be
infringed.
C. The Act of State Doctrine as Applied to Foreign Officials
Beyond a jurisdictional defense of immunity—which as discussed above
is bound up with the Executive’s recognition of power or, in the Fourth Cir-
cuit, is unavailable when plaintiffs have alleged jus cogens violations185—the
act of state doctrine may be able to fill the gap left by the lack of a proper
conduct-based immunity analysis.  Rather than relinquishing jurisdiction on
grounds of immunity, courts could apply the act of state doctrine to individ-
ual officials and dismiss suits on the grounds that American courts “will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another [country] done
within its own territory.”186  When suit is brought against an individual who
was a recognized official of a recognized sovereign for governmental acts
committed within the sovereign territory, the Constitution compels applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine to prevent U.S. courts from questioning the
validity of the act; the ability to divest a foreign sovereign of perfect sovereign
rights rests with the political branches.
As noted earlier, sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine arise
from common origins.187  The distinction between the doctrines is subtle, yet
crucial: “Immunity protects states and their officials from suits in foreign
courts, and the act of state doctrine protects government actions within their
own territory from challenges in foreign courts.”188  Immunity removes the
court’s jurisdiction,189 but the act of state doctrine provides “a substantive
defense on the merits,” because U.S. courts cannot declare a sovereign act
invalid.190  As Professors Bradley and Helfer note, questions of immunity are
185 See supra Part I, Sections II.B, IV.A–B.
186 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964) (quoting Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
187 See supra Part II.
188 Ingrid Wuerth, Foreign Official Immunity Determinations in U.S. Courts: The Case Against
the State Department, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 915, 957 (2011).
189 See supra Section II.A.
190 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 322 (2010) (quoting Republic of Austria v. Alt-
mann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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distinct from the act of state doctrine, and they conclude that the “distin-
guishing factors” between the two doctrines suggest that the act of state doc-
trine “is not a categorical bar to a more assertive judicial role in the
development of . . . immunity principles.”191  The act of state doctrine, how-
ever, should still be considered on its own as a constitutional bar to U.S. courts
issuing judgments against foreign officials.  Until a political branch autho-
rizes divesting a foreign sovereign of the protections of territorial sovereignty,
the Constitution requires that the judicial branch dismiss the suit.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the act of state doctrine exists
as a mechanism for upholding the proper allocation of powers, holding that
the act of state doctrine’s purpose is “to reflect the proper distribution of
functions between the judicial and political branches of the Government on
matters bearing upon foreign affairs.”192  Although the Sabbatino Court
relied on a vague formulation of “separation of powers,” the doctrine can be
grounded in the allocation of specific foreign affairs powers—namely, the
Executive’s recognition power and Congress’s war and reprisal powers.193
The act of state doctrine has historically been applied in the context of
sovereign acts and not directly applied to preclude suit against a foreign offi-
cial.194  The Supreme Court in Samantar acknowledged, however, that “in
the context of the act of state doctrine, . . . an official’s acts can be consid-
ered the acts of the foreign state.”195  Extending the act of state doctrine to
suits against foreign officials prevents circumvention of state sovereign immu-
nity simply by suing officials as individuals, rather than suing the state.
Act of state doctrine analysis as applied to foreign officials would operate
as follows: (1) The act of state doctrine prevents a U.S. court from declaring a
sovereign act undertaken within its own territory invalid; (2) abuse of the
police power that leads to commission of a jus cogens violation is an act that is
purely sovereign in nature; (3) therefore, when an individual official abuses
the police power of the state, he is engaging in a sovereign act; (4) by adjudi-
cating a claim against the official for a jus cogens violation, the court would be
required to declare that a sovereign use of the police power is susceptible to
liability and therefore invalid.  Under the act of state doctrine, U.S. courts
cannot do this.  When a foreign official has engaged in a sovereign act, how-
ever egregious, the constitutional allocation of foreign affairs powers to the
political branches requires the suit to be dismissed in order to avoid infring-
ing on the powers of the Executive and Congress to conduct foreign
relations.
191 Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 256–57.
192 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1964).
193 See supra Section II.B.
194 See supra Section II.B.
195 Samantar, 560 U.S. at 322 (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252, 254
(1897)).
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D. Caveats
Although a broad protection of foreign officials is advanced in this Note,
it is important to recognize two caveats that will always preclude a foreign
official from avoiding judgment in U.S. courts.  Because immunity is an out-
growth of the rights of the recognized sovereign and not the individual him-
self, the foreign state is entitled to remove the cloak of immunity from its
government officials.196  First, the foreign state can waive immunity as to the
individual official.197  Waiver would apply in both status- and conduct-based
immunity, as well as in act of state doctrine analysis.  This situation may occur
in the context of a regime change, wherein the new government approves
the pursuit of human rights litigation in U.S. courts and thus opts to waive
the ability of the country’s former officials to claim immunity.198  The second
situation arises “where the foreign state indicates that the defendant’s actions
were unauthorized or not within the scope of his or her authority.”199  Such a
conclusion by a foreign government would not abrogate status-based immu-
nity, unless the foreign government indicates its intent to waive all immunity,
but it would be applicable in determinations of conduct-based immunity,
which requires the foreign official to have acted within the scope of his
authority.200
CONCLUSION
The status of foreign officials in U.S. courts is in a state of confusion.
But, this does not have to be the case.  The Constitution’s allocation of pow-
ers, informed by the law of nations, requires the courts to err on the side of
over-recognition of the rights of sovereigns.  Denial of immunity in U.S.
courts at the time of the Founding would have been just cause for war, and
today, denial of immunity infringes on the powers of the political branches.
The President and Congress have extensive powers under the Constitution to
conduct foreign relations, while the judiciary does not.  In order to preserve
the political branches’ ability to conduct foreign affairs, the judicial branch
should refrain from adjudicating claims against foreign officials absent
express authorization from Congress or the President exercising one of their
respective foreign affairs powers.
196 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.  It also bears noting that the foreign
official must be recognized as a leader of the sovereign. See United States v. Noriega, 117
F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Noriega never served as the constitutional leader of
Panama, [and] Panama has not sought immunity for Noriega . . . .”).
197 See Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 253.
198 Id. at 253 n.198; see also In Re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that a
foreign government may waive head of state immunity for its officials).
199 Bradley & Helfer, supra note 12, at 253.
200 See id. at 253 n.199 (“In cases involving foreign sovereign immunity, it is also appro-
priate to look to statements of the foreign state that either authorize or ratify the acts at
issue to determine whether the defendant committed the alleged acts in an official capac-
ity.”); see also supra Section IV.B.
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When faced with a claim against a foreign official, courts should make
three separate determinations.  Status-based immunity should be granted in
claims against sitting heads of state or high-ranking foreign officials.  Con-
duct-based immunity should be granted when a claim is brought against any
current or former official acting in his or her official capacity.  And finally,
should either bar to jurisdiction fail, the court should apply the act of state
doctrine and deem valid any sovereign act undertaken in the foreign state’s
territory, even if the act was an abuse of a sovereign power.  Undoubtedly,
there will still remain difficult questions that courts will need to address.201
By exercising judicial restraint and erring on the side of recognition, how-
ever, courts uphold the constitutional allocation of powers and ensure that
difficult foreign affairs questions remain squarely with Congress and the
President.
201 See Wuerth, supra note 188, at 965–66 (noting that courts must develop common
law on issues such as, inter alia, “waiver, who qualifies as a foreign official,” and “the status
of the official’s government” (footnotes omitted)).
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